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Greece’s Sovereign Debt Crisis:  








This paper provides an analysis and assessment of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis, and examines alternative solutions to the problem. In order 
to put the current fiscal predicament of Greece in perspective and 
discuss how the Greek debt crisis might possibly be resolved, the paper 
first provides a detailed account of how the sovereign debt of Greece 
was accumulated and then stabilized relative to GDP. It then proceeds 
with an account of how the international financial crisis led to a de-
stabilization of Greece’s sovereign debt, and with an assessment of the 
adjustment program currently in operation. We address the question of 
solvency, and whether the current program is sufficient for the 
resolution of Greece’s debt crisis. The paper concludes with proposals 
for tackling the confidence crisis and speeding up the recovery of the 
Greek economy. 
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Greece’s Sovereign Debt Crisis:  
Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
«Eurozone finance ministers on Sunday approved a €110bn ($146bn) 
package of emergency loans aimed at averting a sovereign default by 
Greece and preventing a confidence crisis spreading to countries such as 
Spain and Portugal» Financial Times, May 2, 2010. 
«European leaders agreed a further bail-out for Greece worth €109bn, a 
third of which will come in the form of debt swaps or rollovers by private 
sector bondholders» Financial Times, July 22, 2011. 
«European leaders reached a deal with Greek bondholders ... that would 
see private investors take a 50 per cent cut in the face value of their 
bonds, a deep haircut that officials believe will reduce Greek debt levels 
to 120 per cent of gross domestic product by the end of the decade» 
Financial Times, October 27, 2011. 
Since the first few months of 2010, the Greek economy has emerged as 
the first casualty of a sovereign debt crisis that threatens to destabilize 
the euro area and put the fragile recovery of the European economy 
from the recession of 2009 at risk.  
The Greek fiscal situation came to the center of international attention 
after the elections of October 2009. The fiscal deficit of Greece 
worsened significantly during the crisis, as was also the case in many 
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other economies in the euro area and the rest of the world. In addition, 
after many years of significant economic growth, in 2009 the Greek 
economy entered into a prolonged recession, the end of which is not yet 
visible. 
The international financial crisis of 2008 hit the Greek economy at its 
Achilles heel:  The refinancing of the high public debt, which was 
accumulated mainly during the 1980s. Although the fundamentals of the 
Greek economy had improved significantly in the twenty years to 2008, 
during preparations for entry into the euro area and since Greece’s 
entry, public finances and international competitiveness had remained 
as persistent and significant problems throughout the period. Although 
there were short periods of significant improvement in the fiscal 
situation, there were many instances of relapse, especially around 
election years. 
After a steep rise throughout the 1980s, public debt had stabilized at 
about 100% of GDP since the early 1990s. Greece had no problem 
refinancing its debt until the end of 2008. However, in the circumstances 
of the international financial crisis, the refinancing of the debt started 
becoming a problem, and spreads over the German benchmark rates 
started to widen. The problem became much more serious after the 
elections of October 2009. Greece found itself at the center of a wave of 
criticism by the international press, international organizations, rating 
agencies and the European Commission. Despite the fact that the fiscal 
situation in 2009 worsened throughout Europe and the rest of the world, 
in many countries much more than in Greece, Greece was the first 
sovereign to find itself in the middle of a confidence crisis. 
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There are three likely reasons for this. The first was the high level of 
Greece’s public debt. Greece’s public debt had stabilized since the early 
1990s at roughly 100% of GDP, versus 70% for the average of the Euro 
area. The second reason was the announcement of a large deterioration 
of the projected deficit for 2009, by the government elected in October 
2009. This took the markets by surprise and contributed to the 
confidence crisis. The third reason is related to the shortcomings of the 
fiscal program initially adopted by the newly elected government, which 
appeared to be leading to a further widening of the fiscal deficit rather 
than a contraction. 
Under these circumstances, Greece faced a severe confidence crisis, a 
sustained speculative attack on its bonds, and the eventual setting up of 
a special European Support Mechanism, with the participation of the 
IMF. Since the end of April 2010 Greece has effectively been excluded 
from international financial markets. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis and assessment of the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis, and to examine alternative solutions to the 
problem. In order to put the current fiscal predicament of Greece in 
perspective and discuss how the Greek debt crisis might possibly be 
resolved, the paper first provides a detailed account of how the 
sovereign debt of Greece was accumulated and then stabilized relative 
to GDP. We then proceed with an account of how the international 
financial crisis led to a de-stabilization of Greece’s sovereign debt, and 
proceed to assess the adjustment program currently in operation. We 
address the question of the sustainability of Greek debt, and whether 
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the current program is sufficient for the resolution of Greece’s debt 
crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 1 we discuss the concept of 
debt sustainability or solvency, which is central to the Greek crisis. It is 
shown that solvency depends on four factors, only one of which is under 
the immediate control of a government in the short run: First, the 
government debt to GDP ratio, second, the real interest rate, third, the 
real GDP growth rate, and, finally, the ratio of the primary budget 
surplus to GDP. Of these, only the primary budget surplus can be used as 
a policy instrument by a small open economy in a monetary union. The 
other three factors are to a large extent exogenous or pre-determined. 
Having this framework in mind, in section 2 we provide a broad survey of 
developments in the Greek economy, since the restoration of democracy 
in 1974. In section 3, we examine macroeconomic policy during the 
same period, with an emphasis on fiscal policy and debt sustainability. 
We distinguish among four distinct historical phases: the preparation for 
EEC entry (1975-1980), the macroeconomic populism of the 1980s 
(1981-1989), the convergence period of the 1990s (1990-1999), and the 
period of euro participation before the crisis (2000-2008). Public debt 
exploded as a share of GDP mainly during the 1980s and was then 
stabilized relative to GDP until 2008. Thus, until 2008, lack of fiscal 
sustainability was an issue mainly during the 1980s, the period which 
caused Greece’s sovereign debt to rise from about 25% to 100% of GDP. 
In section 4, we briefly discuss the macroeconomics of debt crises. 
Models of debt crises predict that such crises can occur very rapidly, 
both as a result of deterioration in fiscal fundamentals, but also as a 
result of shifts in the expectations of investors. Such models seem to 
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explain the evolution of the Greek sovereign debt crisis quite 
adequately. In section 5 we survey the evolution of Greek fiscal 
developments, since the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, the 
adjustment program set in place in the first half of 2010 and 
amendments to the adjustment program since. Greek public debt 
exploded in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. In the three years to 2011 it 
rose to more than 150% of GDP. However, the Greek debt crisis is not 
only a solvency crisis. In many ways it is a liquidity crisis, caused by a 
collapse in confidence. In section 6 we look at the “orderly default” 
option as part of a solution for the Greek sovereign debt crisis and 
discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving 
sustainability, restoring confidence and resolving the Greek crisis. The 
final section sums up the conclusions.  
 
2.  Conditions for Fiscal Sustainability and Solvency 
At the heart of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis is the issue of fiscal 
sustainability or solvency. Thus, before we start discussing the Greek 
crisis, it is worth looking at the issue of public debt sustainability or 
solvency. This discussion will provide us with the necessary tools in order 
to assess the sovereign debt crisis faced by Greece. 
 
2.1. Defining Fiscal Sustainability and Solvency 
It is well known that governments need not balance their budgets at all 
times (see Romer 1996). Fiscal sustainability, or solvency, requires that 
the government ought to create and maintain primary surpluses the 
present value of which is (greater than or) equal to the original debt. 
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The intertemporal government budget constraint of a solvent 
government simply states that, 
Bt = Et
1









∑ St + i
  (1) 
E is the mathematical expectations operator, B is public debt (both at 
time t), r is the real interest rate and S the primary surplus of the 
government budget. 
Equation (1) simply requires that the expected present value of future 
primary surpluses is equal to the initial public debt at time t. 
A fiscal path that only satisfies (1), is sustainable, as the only restriction 
that the budget constraint (1) places on a government is that the present 
value of its expected future debt, as we move further and further into 











 Bt +n = 0
  (2) 
The intertemporal government budget constraint (1), which defines 
fiscal sustainability, does not prevent the government from staying 
permanently in debt, or even from increasing the amount of its debt. For 
example, if the real interest rate is positive, a constant value of B, 
meaning that the government never pays back its debt, clearly satisfies 
the intertemporal government budget constraint. Even an increasing 
level of debt satisfies the intertemporal government budget constraint, 
for as long as the growth rate of government debt is less than the real 
interest rate. Even a rate of growth of government debt which is higher 
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than the real interest rate satisfies (1) and (2), if it only lasts for a limited 
number of periods and is then followed by a policy of limiting the growth 
rate of the debt to a rate below the real interest rate. 
From the viewpoint of equations (1) and (2), there is an infinite number 
of “sustainable” paths of fiscal or debt policy, many of which involve a 
quickly rising level of government debt for a finite and possibly large 
number of periods. To put it another way, governments can always claim 
that they intend to raise primary surpluses in the future to limit the 
growth rate of government debt. 
A sustainable path of fiscal policy in the sense outlined above cannot be 
monitored credibly by investors in government bonds. If investors doubt 
government pronouncements about future fiscal action to limit the 
growth of the debt, then interest rates may have to rise (reflecting 
default probabilities), making the growth rate of the debt even higher, 
and thus making the debt situation worse. A confidence crisis may 
ensue, such as the one facing Greece and other Euro area economies. 
Thus, sustainability in the sense of equations (1) and (2) cannot possibly 
be monitored or even measured adequately, since that would require 
governments that would be able to pre-commit to the entire future path 
of primary government surpluses. 
In what follows, I will use a narrower but stronger definition of 
government solvency. I will define a sustainable fiscal path as one that at 
the very least stabilizes the government debt to GDP ratio. This definition 
is stronger than the previous one, and, more importantly, sustainability 
or solvency in this sense can be easily measured and monitored. 
  8 
To define sustainability in terms of the public debt to GDP ratio, we start 
from the flow version of the intertemporal government budget 
constraint. 
Bt − Bt −1 = rt Bt −1 − St   (3) 
Equation (3) simply states that the government deficit leads to a rise in 
government debt. The government deficit consists of interest payments 
on the debt minus the primary government surplus (or if you like plus 
the primary government deficit). 
Dividing through by GDP, we have, 
bt − bt −1 =
rt − gt
1 + gt
bt −1 − st
 (4) 
b is the debt to GDP ratio, s the primary surplus to GDP ratio and g the 
growth rate of GDP. 
From (4), the primary government surplus that is consistent with a 







  (5) 
A primary surplus to GDP ratio which is at least as high as that implied by 
equation (5), is associated with fiscal sustainability or solvency. If it is 
lower, then the fiscal situation is unsustainable and the government is 
insolvent. 
In what follows, we shall use equation (5) to assess the factors that 
affect fiscal sustainability. 
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2.2. The Four Factors that Affect Fiscal Sustainability and Solvency 
From equation (5), one can see that there are four factors that 
determine whether a government is solvent: 
 the predetermined (historical) debt to GDP ratio, 
 the primary surplus as a share of GDP, 
 the real interest rate on government bonds 
 the growth rate of real GDP 
These are the four factors that determine solvency and the sustainability 
of government debt. 
These four factors are not independent of each other, and, with the 
exception of the primary surplus, they are outside the direct control of 
governments. 
In an open economy, in the short and the medium run, the growth rate 
of GDP depends on the state of the economic cycle, on the determinants 
of domestic investment, and in particular the expectations of domestic 
firms and households about the future profitability of investment in 
physical and human capital, as well as on the determinants of domestic 
savings and the real interest rate. All these factors can be affected by 
government policy only indirectly. In the long run, the growth rate may 
well be exogenous, determined by population growth and technological 
progress. 
With full capital mobility, for a small open economy in a monetary union, 
such as Greece’s, the real interest rate is also largely exogenous and 
outside the immediate control of the government. 
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The historical sovereign debt to GDP is predetermined and cannot be 
changed, unless the government defaults. The debt to GDP ratio has 
been determined through an accumulation process (equation (3)) than 
was a function of past outcomes of the government budget. 
The main element under the direct control of a government in the short 
run and in the medium run is the government primary surplus to GDP 
ratio. It is the main tool that can be used by a government to achieve 
solvency. Although it is not a perfect tool of policy, the government 
primary surplus can be changed through decisions on primary 
government expenditure and revenue. Tax and expenditure policy can 
affect solvency even in the short run. 
Keeping in mind the four factors that affect solvency, we can now move 
to an historical account and interpretation of Greece’s sovereign debt 
developments before the recent crisis. 
 
3.  Greek Macroeconomic Developments since 1974 
For a number of years after World War II, and the civil war that only 
ended in 1949, Greece’s macroeconomic performance was among the 
most impressive not only in Europe, but also in the rest of the world. 
This remained the case until the early 1970s. 
Greece was affected negatively from the first oil shock of the 1970s, but 
recovered relatively quickly. Democracy was restored in 1974, after a 
seven-year dictatorship, and Greece applied to enter the EEC in 1975. 
However, following the second oil shock, admittance into the EEC in 
1981, and the election of a socialist government in the same year, 
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Greece entered a period of stagflation and rapid public debt 
accumulation, which lasted throughout the 1980s.
1
  
In 1990, after another change in government, Greece initiated a program 
of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, in order to prepare itself 
for eventual participation in the single European currency. Greece was 
among the signatories of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, and secured its 
participation in the Euro area in the year 2000. Economic growth 
recovered gradually during the 1990s, inflation was gradually contained 
and public debt was stabilized relative to GDP. 
The period of Euro participation between 2001 and 2008 was a golden 
era for the Greek economy. Growth rates increased further, inflation 
remained subdued, although slightly higher than the Euro area average, 
and unemployment fell. The public debt to GDP ratio was stabilized and 
solvency was not a problem. However, the fiscal situation remained 
precarious, as underlying fiscal problems remained. The public debt to 
GDP ratio was stabilized at about 100%, which was much higher than the 
average for the Euro area. In addition, Greece’s mechanisms of 
controlling primary government expenditure remained weak, in areas 
such as local authorities, social security funds and the health sector, 
while tax evasion undermined the effectiveness of the tax system. It is 
for these reasons that, when the international financial crisis 
deteriorated in 2008, the fiscal situation emerged as Greece’s Achilles 
heel once more. 
                                                 
1
 I have examined the post-war macroeconomic experience of Greece until the early 1990s in 
a number of analytical papers. See Alogoskoufis (1995), Alogoskoufis and Christodoulakis 
(1991), Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1992, 1998). 
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Greece’s macroeconomic performance since 1975 is summarized in 
Charts 1-4, which present the growth rate, unemployment, inflation and 
the current account, together with comparable developments in the 
euro area.  
Chart 1 presents Greece’s growth rate between 1975 and 2008. In the 
period before 1974, between 1954 and 1973, Greece’s growth rate was 
of the order of 7% per annum. This was 2 percentage points higher than 
the average growth rate of the OECD area. Economic growth started 
decelerating at the end of the 1970s, fell to almost zero during the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s, and started recovering after 1994. 
Between 1974 and 1993 the average growth rate was only 2% per 
annum, while since 1997 it doubled to about 4%.  
Greece experienced only short and shallow recessions since 1975. The 
longest recession was during the period of stagflation in 1981-3. The 
other two recessions, of 1987 and 1993 were short lived. After 1997, 
when it started becoming apparent that Greece would be able to 
participate in the euro area, economic growth picked up significantly and 
there was no other recession until the onset of the 2008 financial crisis.  
As one would have expected, the slowdown in economic growth after 
1979 was accompanied by a rise in unemployment. Chart 2 plots 
Greece’s unemployment rate since the restoration of democracy. As can 
be seen from Chart 2 the unemployment rate climbed to 7% in the early 
1980s, where it stabilized for a number of years. Since the early 1990s, 
unemployment rose again. It started falling long after the acceleration of 
GDP growth, at around 2000, and continued falling until 2008. 
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By and large, these developments reflect similar developments in 
European unemployment. In fact, the unemployment rate in Greece had 
been consistently lower than in the Euro area of 12, until 1999. Since 
then, it rose above the Euro area average, but by 2008 it had converged 
back towards the Euro area average. Despite robust growth, that 
exceeded the euro area average, unemployment in Greece remained 
above the euro area average since 1999. Many attribute this to the 
failure of Greece to implement labour market reforms and the 
deterioration of Greece’s international competitiveness.   
As we shall see below, unemployment rates in both Greece and the Euro 
Area rose sharply in 2009, due to the recession, and are currently 
forecast to continue rising until at least 2012. 
We next turn to inflation. In the twenty years before 1974, average 
inflation in Greece was 4%, the same as in the rest of the OECD. In the 
next twenty years it rose to 16% on average, more than ten percentage 
points above the OECD average. It was only after Greece started to 
prepare for its eventual participation in the single European currency 
that inflation started converging. After all, the permanent reduction of 
inflation was one of the main economic reasons that Greece aimed to 
become part of the Euro area. 
Inflation converged to the Euro area average during the 1990s, and has 
remained only slightly above that average since Greece became part of 
the Euro area in 2000. 
These developments are depicted in Chart 3. The convergence of 
inflation was particularly rapid during the 1990s, as Greece abandoned 
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wage indexation and the policy of accommodating inflation differentials 
with its trading partners, through exchange rate depreciations and a 
loose monetary policy. The rapid convergence of inflation, and the 
associated convergence of nominal and real interest rates, has been one 
of the high points of Greece’s adjustment efforts during the 1990s. 
However, inflation did not fully converge. It remained above the Euro 
area average by one percentage point during the first decade of 
Greece’s participation in the Euro area. This resulted in a gradual erosion 
of international competitiveness, and has contributed to the external 
imbalances that Greece has been experiencing throughout this period. 
In the period after 1973, Greece has suffered from periodic balance of 
payments crises. Such crises occurred in 1973-4, 1982-3, 1984-5 and 
1989-90. Some of these crises led to devaluations, such as in 1983 and 
1985, while in other cases, discrete devaluations were averted. 
Throughout the period, Greece has been following a crawling-peg policy 
of continuous small depreciations of the exchange rate, to 
accommodate inflationary differentials with its trading partners. In turn, 
this policy contributed to the maintenance of these inflationary 
differentials, through the wage-price spiral. 
Greece’s current account developments are depicted in Chart 4. The 
current account was in surplus at the end of the 1970s. It went into 
deficit in the beginning of the 1980s. The deficits were on average small 
and contained, and when crises occurred there were devaluations. 
However, the current account deficit increased significantly as economic 
growth picked up after 1996, and particularly since the introduction of 
the euro. After the introduction of the euro, the current account deficit 
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rose to about 12% of GDP, and exceeded 14% of GDP in 2007. This was 
mainly due to autonomous capital inflows, as confidence in the Greek 
economy rose. The loss of competitiveness certainly contributed, but 
cannot be considered as the main driving force of developments in the 
current account deficit. The swing in the capital account to a large 
surplus seems to have been the main factor after the introduction of the 
euro. In effect, the external constraint was released, and the balance of 
payments stopped acting as a significant constraining factor for 
macroeconomic policy. 
These have been the main macroeconomic developments in Greece 
between the restoration of democracy in 1974 and the sovereign debt 
crisis of 2009. In order to explain these developments we have already 
alluded to policy choices. To fully understand them however, we must 
delve deeper into policy, in particular fiscal, monetary and incomes 
policy, and its interaction with domestic politics. 
 
4.  Politics and Macroeconomic Policy in Greece 
One can usefully distinguish four discrete periods in Greek 
macroeconomic policy since the restoration of democracy in 1974. The 
first is the preparation period for EEC entry. It lasted between 1975 and 
1980. The second is the period of macroeconomic populism, during the 
1980s. The third is the convergence period of the 1990s, preparing 
Greece for entry into the euro area. The fourth is the period of euro area 
participation, from 2000 until 2008, when the international financial 
crisis broke out. Clearly, the international crisis ushered in a new fifth 
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period for Greek macroeconomic policy, which we shall review in section 
5. 
Politics played a significant role in these choices. The two parties 
alternating in power throughout this period were New Democracy (ND) 
and the PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). The Greek political 
system has traditionally been characterized by a deep polarization. 
However, in the 1990s there was political convergence around the target 
of entry into the Euro Area. The timing of Greek elections and the 
political affiliation of Greek governments are summarized in Table 1. 
Macroeconomic policy in the first five years after the restoration of 
democracy was dominated by the goal of preparing Greece for EEC 
entry. The economy recovered quickly from the recession of 1974, 
unemployment was maintained at low levels, inflation decelerated and 
the current account was in surplus. Until 1981, the fiscal deficit was 
contained below 3% of GDP and public debt was only around 25% of 
GDP. The last part of this period was characterized by stagflation, caused 
by the second oil shock of 1979. Growth was reduced from 7.2% in 1978 
to only 0.7% in 1980. Inflation almost doubled to 22.5% in 1980, from 
13.2% in 1978. Unemployment doubled from 1.9% of the labor force in 
1978 to 4% in 1981. 
The decade of macroeconomic populism started after EEC entry in 1981. 
In electoral 1981, which was a year of world recession, the fiscal deficit 
rose from 2.6% of GDP in 1980 to 9% in 1981. The situation worsened by 
the policies followed by the newly elected PASOK government. Within a 
few years public debt had exploded, as deficits remained persistently 
high. High inflation also developed into a persistent problem for the 
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Greek economy, accommodated by a loose monetary and exchange rate 
policy. The economy stagnated, as economic growth fell to almost zero 
for most of the 1980s and unemployment increased further. 
This decade of macroeconomic populism bequeathed Greece with two 
of the most significant problems that have since burdened its economy: 
high public debt and low international competitiveness. 
 
4.1. The Explosion of Public Debt 
Until the mid-1970s Greek governments followed a so-called «golden 
rule» of fiscal policy, allowing deficits only in the public investment 
program. Since 1978, this rule started being gradually abandoned, and 
the fiscal deficit exploded during the electoral 1981. After the socialists 
were elected in October 1981, fiscal deficits remained consistently high, 
and, as a result, public debt exploded. 
The evolution of Greek public debt is depicted in Chart 5. As can be seen 
from Chart 5, public debt rose from about 20% of GDP in the early 1980s 
to almost 100% of GDP in the early 1990s. In addition, a large part of the 
debt remained «invisible», outside official figures, until 1993, when it 
was incorporated into official figures. In the 1990s, public debt was 
stabilized at slightly below 100% of GDP, as a program of fiscal 
adjustment was adopted in the context of the convergence programs of 
the Greek economy. Following the adoption of the euro, public debt rose 
above 100% of GDP in electoral 2000, and displayed a weak downward 
trend until 2007. 
When the international financial crisis hit Greece in late 2008, the public 
debt to GDP ratio was at 99%, versus 70% for the average of the Euro 
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Area. The policies of the 1980s had in effect created a permanent 
burden for the Greek economy. 
The main reason for the rise of the public debt to GDP ratio during the 
1980s was high primary government deficits. The socialist governments 
of Andreas Papandreou followed an expansionary fiscal policy, financed 
through internal and external debt and inflows from the EEC. In the ten 
years between 1981 and 1990, the general government deficit was at 
almost 10% of GDP on average, something that has never happened 
before or since for such a long period. 
The evolution of the government deficit to GDP ratio is depicted in Chart 
6. It is impressive how the deficit of the general government widened 
during the 1980s. Originally, this was due to high primary deficits, which 
were the initial source of fiscal destabilization. After some time, interest 
payments took over as an additional destabilizing source. The debt to 
GDP ratio increased and interest payments on the high and rising debt 
kept rising relative to GDP. It is also worth noting that both nominal and 
real interest rates rose in the second part of the 1980s, because of 
gradual financial liberalization. This had an additional effect on the 
deficit, but made its financing easier, as Greek bonds became more 
attractive to international bondholders. 
A second reason for the rise in the government debt to GDP ratio during 
the 1980s was the slowdown in economic growth, which had an adverse 
effect on the denominator of the ratio and affected the dynamic 
evolution of debt. 
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Apart from recorded deficits and the slowdown in economic growth, 
there was a third reason for the rise in the public debt to GDP ratio in 
Greece during the 1980s. That was government guarantees for loans of 
both private and public enterprises and organizations, as well as 
agricultural cooperatives. By 1989, these guarantees had risen to 32% of 
GDP. In the next three years, half of those loans could not be serviced 
and were taken up by the government, causing an additional increase in 
public debt. 
The populist fiscal policies of the 1980s, and the inadequate adjustment 
since the 1990s, have contributed to Greece’ high debt to GDP ratio 
when the financial crisis of 2008 erupted. In fact, the high level of the 
debt and the large re-financing needs associated with it, proved to be 
the «Achilles heel» of the Greek economy. 
However, high public debt is not the only negative legacy of the 1980s. 
The policies of the 1980s led to stagnation, loss of international 
competitiveness, and a dramatic divergence of Greek living standards 
relative to the rest of the European Community. 
 
4.2. Competitiveness, Economic Divergence and Convergence 
The loss of competitiveness is related to the extension of the economic 
role of the inefficient Greek state and the interaction of incomes, 
monetary and exchange rate policies. 
Greek inflation rose significantly in 1973. This was due to the first oil 
shock and the effective depreciation of the drachma, which remained 
pegged to the falling US dollar. Inflation reached its peak in 1974 and 
was contained in 1975-78. However, the second oil shock led to another 
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acceleration of inflation. This rise proved more permanent, because of 
the widening of fiscal deficits and the accommodative monetary, 
exchange rate and incomes policy. 
This second inflationary episode led to a vicious wage-price spiral. This 
continued until 1986, when a two-year wage freeze was imposed, 
following a devaluation of the drachma. After 1988, there was an 
attempted catch-up of wages, which led to yet another acceleration of 
inflation and loss of competitiveness. 
The rise in inflation in the 1980s can be explained as an ineffective 
attempt by the government of the time to use incomes, monetary and 
exchange rate policy, in order to improve living standards and reduce 
unemployment. At the end of the day, all that was left was inflation and 
loss of competitiveness. This should not have come as a surprise. Greece 
learned at great cost in the 1980s that it is not possible to improve 
competitiveness or fiscal imbalances through monetary means. All that 
is left at the end of the day is inflation. 
This policy, along with the expansion of the role of the state, led the real 
economy to a dramatic divergence. 
In Chart 7, we present data for Greece’s GDP per capita, relative to the 
original 15 members of the European Union. As can clearly be seen, until 
Greece achieved entry into the EEC there was convergence. After EEC 
entry, there was divergence for almost twenty years. While in 1980, the 
year before EEC entry, Greece’s GDP per capita was at 92,5% of the EU-
15 average, in 1999, a year before entry into the Euro Area, it had fallen 
at only 70,2%: a dramatic divergence of more than 20 percentage points 
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in 20 years. Greece was diverging from the rest of the EU by almost a 
percentage point per annum, as growth rates were lower than the EU-15 
average. This may have been the biggest cost of the policies that 
characterized the period of populism and the inadequacy of the reforms 
that started in 1990. 
In any event, since 1990 there was a policy reversal. Attempts at fiscal 
adjustment, monetary and exchange rate stabilization, and liberalization 
of the economy were the main directions of this reversed policy. Despite 
their weaknesses, these efforts led to the drastic reduction of inflation, 
Greece’s accession to the Euro Area and a new era of economic growth 
and real convergence. 
However, as can be seen from Chart 6, after Greece’s adoption of the 
euro, we had a repetition, on a smaller scale, of the fiscal destabilization 
that followed Greece’s entry into the EEC. In addition, inflation remained 
higher by about one percentage point, that the Euro Area average. This 
led to a further erosion of Greece’s international competitiveness. 
To conclude, when the financial crisis hit the international economy, 
Greece was still plagued by fiscal imbalances and low international 
competitiveness. Despite efforts to address the situation since the 
1990s, public debt had been stabilized at a high level relative to GDP, 
and the fiscal situation remained as one of the most serious problems of 
the Greek economy. In addition, the structural reforms that were 
introduced since 1990 in order to improve international competitiveness 
still had a long way to go. 
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5.  The Macroeconomics of Debt Crises 
Before we move on to discuss the onset of the Greek crisis, it is worth 
reviewing the macroeconomics of debt crises. Why is it that the same 
markets that comfortably held and continuously refinanced the debt of a 
sovereign state for years on end, suddenly lose faith and refuse to touch 
it? 
To answer this question, one can start with the equilibrium relationship 
between the return of domestic bonds (deemed unsafe) and a safe 
bond. With risk neutral investors, in equilibrium, the relationship 
between the real interest rate of a domestic (Greek) bond and a safe 
(German) bond, would be given by, 
(1-π)(1+r)=1+r*  (6) 
π is the expected probability of default of the domestic bond, r the 
domestic real interest rate and r* the safe interest rate. From (6), the 
probability of default is given by, 
π=(r-r*)/(1+r)  (7) 
Equation (7) gives us the equilibrium relation between the perceived 
probability of default of the domestic bond π, and the spread between 
the interest rates of the domestic and the safe bond r-r*. The two are 
positively related: If the perceived probability of default is zero, then the 
domestic interest rate will be equal to the interest rate on the safe bond. 
As the probability of default increases, so does the spread and the 
domestic interest rate. As the probability of default approaches unity 
(100%), the spread, and the domestic interest rate approach infinity. 
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Macroeconomic models of debt crises emphasize that if there is a risk of 
default, debt markets will be characterized by multiple equilibria. Which 
equilibrium will prevail will depend on the expectations of investors 
about the probability of default (see Calvo 1988). There are equilibria in 
which investors expect repayment with a high probability, in which case 
the spread of the government bond in question over the safe asset is 
small, and equilibria in which investors expect default with a high 
probability, in which case the spread effectively becomes very large or 
even infinite. In the second type of equilibria the government in 
question may find that it cannot refinance its bonds and be forced to 
default, even though it never intended to do so. 
There are a number of characteristics of these models which are 
relevant to the Greek crisis, and indeed other sovereign debt crises. 
First, small changes in the fundamentals may cause an economy to shift 
from a low-spread equilibrium to a high-spread equilibrium, or even to 
default. Second, such a change in the nature of the equilibrium is always 
unanticipated. In fact it occurs when expectations suddenly change. 
Third, a change in the nature of the equilibrium can take place even 
without changes in the fundamentals, just because the assessment of 
some investors about the probability of default changed, and these 
investors are not willing to hold the bonds of the country in question. 
These will force even investors who have not changed their beliefs to 
change their behaviour, as they may become worried about whether 
there will be enough investors in the future willing to hold the bonds in 
question. 
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The Calvo-type model of debt crises is very relevant to the Greek case. 
As we shall show below, the fundamentals of the Greek fiscal situation 
changed because of the international financial crisis and the recession 
that ensued, causing investors to question the ability of Greece to keep 
servicing its debt. This in turn brought about a liquidity crisis in the 
market for Greek bonds, and since there were few signs that Greece was 
prepared to adjust its primary surplus to achieve solvency, and no 
committed lender of last resort, Greece was cut off from the 
international bond market. It avoided an outright default because it 
could turn to a special European support mechanism that was devised in 
a rush. 
 
6.  The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The key event which set the stage for the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
was the international financial crisis of 2008. 
In 2008 the world economy entered its most severe crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The crisis rapidly spread to the real economy in 
the US, the European Union and the rest of the world. The financial crisis 
affected trade and investment, consumption, jobs and living standards 
everywhere. 
There is no doubt that the financial crisis started in the US economy - at 
the heart of the global financial system. Following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on September the 15
th
 2008, the global financial 
system entered a phase of severe deleveraging, malfunctioning credit 
markets, unprecedented write-downs in asset valuations, generalized 
risk aversion, and threats to the stability of the banking sector. 
  25 
The initial responses of policy seemed to suggest that policymakers have 
learned important lessons from the mistakes that were made in the 
1930s. Nonetheless, they also showed the limitations of macroeconomic 
policy. Macroeconomic policy could not avert a deep recession. Central 
banks did provide liquidity to avert a credit crunch, governments bailed 
out major financial institutions, protectionism was held at bay and 
international policy coordination included the emerging economies for 
the first time. Yet the recession in 2009 was deep and embraced almost 
the entire world. 
 
6.1. The International Crisis and the Euro Area 
The international financial crisis unveiled serious weaknesses in the 
functioning of the global financial and economic system. Serious 
regulatory and policy mistakes that had persisted for many years 
contributed to the severity of the problem. Economic risks had been 
seriously underestimated in the pricing of financial assets and asset 
bubbles had persisted for too long, supported by an abundance of 
liquidity. Macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances had developed in the 
global economy without any serious attempt to address them through 
coordinated action. The emerging economies had not been integrated 
adequately to the system of global economic governance. 
In Europe policy makers initially failed to anticipate the full impact of the 
crisis on the European economy. The initial assessment at the beginning 
of 2008 was that the European economy would escape the worst. In the 
spring of 2008, the European Commission forecast was that the rate of 
growth in the Euro area would slow down to 1.7% in 2008 and 1.5% 
2009, from 2.6% in 2007. This assessment was fully revised since the 
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summer of 2008. In its autumn forecasts, the Commission assessment 
was that the Euro area economy would have a growth rate of 1.2% in 
2008 and 0.1% in 2009. In fact, the economy slowed down to 0.6% in 
2008, and entered a severe recession in 2009. Euro area GDP fell by 4.1% 
in 2009. 
These developments were not too dissimilar to what has happened in 
the rest of the industrialized world. The US experienced a smaller 
recession in 2009, as GDP contracted by 2.4%, and the recovery is 
expected to be stronger. The economy of Japan contracted by 5.2%, and 
non-Euro area economies in Europe (the UK, Denmark and Sweden) 
contracted by 4.9%. On the other hand, the rise of unemployment in the 
US has been sharper than in the Euro area, while the rise on 
unemployment in Japan has been lower. 
As one would have expected, the crisis led to a severe worsening of 
public finances. This was due to the operation of automatic stabilizers, 
the cost of bailing out the financial sector and discretionary fiscal 
measures. The average fiscal deficit in the Euro area rose from just 0.7% 
of GDP in 2007 to 6.3% of GDP in 2009. This is much smaller than the 
fiscal deficit of the US which quadrupled to 11.2% of GDP in 2009, from 
2.8% in 2007. The average Euro area fiscal deficit was also smaller than 
the UK deficit which exceeded 11% of GDP in 2009. 
Public debt has been rising significantly as a result. In the Euro area it is 
rising from 66.2% of GDP in 2007 to a projected 88.5% in 2012. In the US 
general government debt is rising from 62.4% of GDP in 2007 to a 
projected 102.4% in 2011 and similar developments are taking place 
elsewhere. 
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The worsened fiscal situation worldwide remains a concern, even after 
the recession of 2009. 
 
6.2. The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis 
It was against this background that the Greek sovereign debt crisis took 
place. 
After two and a half years of significant adjustment, which reduced the 
general government deficit from 7.5% of GDP in 2004 to 3.6% in 2006, 
the Greek fiscal situation started deteriorating again from the middle of 
2007. In 2009, the year of the global recession, the deficit of the general 
government exploded again to 13.6% of GDP.
2
 
In October 2009, the incoming government claimed that the previous 
administration had concealed the extent of the deterioration of public 
finances in fiscal 2009. However, the new government did not appear 
willing or ready to proceed with fiscal adjustment. In fact, in its first few 
months in office, it further contributed to the deterioration of the fiscal 
situation, as government revenue collapsed and measures that 
increased government expenditure were adopted. In addition, the 
budget for 2010, drafted in November 2009, was not deemed credible 
by either the markets or the European Commission and the Eurogroup. 
The first signs of a forthcoming sovereign debt crisis appeared in the 
spread of Greek government bonds over comparable German 
government bonds. In Chart 8, we present the relevant data. The spread 
which had remained quite low since Greece’s participation in the Euro 
                                                 
2 This figure was later revised to 15.4% of GDP after public enterprises were included in 
the accounts of the general government. 
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area, had started widening from early 2008, as the international financial 
crisis was gaining momentum. From about 30 basis points (0,3%) at the 
end of 2007, it doubled to about 60 basis points in the first half of 2008 
and, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it rose further: to about 100 
basis points in October 2008 and to 200 basis points in December 2008. 
In early 2009, after a reshuffle in the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
that was interpreted as signaling an electoral strategy of fiscal policy 
relaxation, spreads increased further. By March 2009 they had reached 
285 basis points.   
This episode was partly reversed, when the government managed to 
cover its annual financing needs in the first half of 2009. Spreads then 
started falling, and by September 2009 they had gone back to 130 basis 
points. The change in government in October, the announcement of a 
doubling of the projected government deficit for 2009 and the failure of 
the new government to present a credible plan of fiscal consolidation 
caused spreads to erupt. Initially the market waited for the budget plans 
of the new administration. Thus, spreads remained at 136 basis points in 
October and 162 basis points in November. When the new budget failed 
to convince the markets, spreads started rising sharply. From 235 basis 
points in December 2009, by April 2010 they had shot up to 477 basis 
points. 
By early 2010, the Greek government was in panic. A full-scale 
confidence crisis had been ignited. The policy of trying to expose its 
predecessor had misfired, as Greece had lost all credibility, and the new 
government’s continuous revisions of its fiscal plans failed to convince 
either the markets, or its European partners. Announcements by the 
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Eurogroup that it would stand by Greece also failed to convince bond 
markets, as they were short on substance. In February, European Union 
leaders vowed to take «determined and co-ordinated action» to protect 
Greece, but there was no respite. Greek bonds were continuously being 
downgraded by rating agencies. By late March, it became apparent that 
the Greek government would have severe difficulties refinancing 
maturing debt or raising new capital. It went cap in hand to its European 
partners, who had been working on a rescue mechanism that also 
involved the IMF. 
The severe confidence crisis caused by this line of events led to the 
eventual setting up on May 2, 2010, of a special European Support 
Mechanism, with the participation of the IMF. Since that date, Greece 
has effectively been excluded from international financial markets. 
At the end of April 2010 the Euro Area countries agreed to provide to 
Greece €80bn in bilateral loans, coordinated by the European 
Commission, with an additional amount of up to €30bn available from 
the IMF. A rolling quarterly review process of Greek efforts to address 
the fiscal situation before the installments are paid out was set up. Euro 
area countries contributed to the loan package according to the ratio of 
their contributions to the European Central Bank. Interest rates were set 
at about 5 per cent, higher than the cost of raising the funds in the 
markets. 
At the same time, it was decided to create the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), that would be able to issue bonds or other debt 
instruments on the market, to raise the funds needed to provide loans to 
countries in financial difficulties. Issues would be backed by guarantees 
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given by the euro area member countries, and would amount up to €440 
billion. 
In July 2011, as it gradually appeared unlikely that Greece would be able 
to return to the markets in 2012, as originally envisioned, Euro Area 
countries agreed to additional official financing. They agreed “to support 
a new program for Greece and, together with the IMF and the voluntary 
contribution of the private sector, to fully cover the financing gap. The 
total additional official financing would amount to an estimated 109 
billion euro.” The maturity of official loans to Greece was extended and 
interest rates were reduced. The European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) was also given new powers to make short-term loans, provide 
funds to recapitalize banks and in “exceptional” circumstances even buy 
back bonds of debt-laden governments. 
The July 2011 program was amended and extended in October 2011, as 
private investors, under pressure from Euro area leaders, agreed to take 
a 50% cut in the face value of their bonds, instead of the 21% envisaged 
in the July agreement. In addition, Euro area countries agreed to 
leverage the resources of the EFSF. 
In November 2011, the Greek prime minister resigned, after a call for a 
referendum on the latest bail-out misfired, and an interim coalition 
government was formed, under an internationally respected Greek 
central banker. This is the Greek saga so far. 
 
6.3. The Greek Adjustment Program of 2010 
Under the conditions of the original European bailout, the Greek 
government agreed to follow a drastic 5 year program of fiscal 
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adjustment and structural reforms. The initial measures aimed to reduce 
the budget deficit by five percentage points of gross domestic product in 
2010 and another four points in 2011. Greece is required to reduce fiscal 
deficits below 3 per cent of GDP by 2014. 
The Greek program had two main aims: first, to restore the sustainability 
of the Greek fiscal situation and, second, to improve the 
competitiveness of the Greek economy.  
The 2010 adjustment program was revised twice, in the face of 
insufficient fiscal adjustment and another revision of Greece’s fiscal 
accounts. The first revision followed the decision in the autumn of 2010 
to include public enterprises in the general government accounts, while 
the second revision, in the spring of 2011, became necessary because of 
the failure of the 2010 budget to meet the program targets. A third 
revision is already under way, after the October 2011 decisions. Yet, the 
various revisions of the program so far, follow the structure to the 
original program and rely on similar policies. The program is structured 
in terms of drastic but gradual fiscal adjustment and reforms to improve 
the competitiveness of the Greek economy. 
There are many who doubt that Greece can indeed get out of its fiscal 
predicament through the adjustment program agreed between Greece, 
the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF and its subsequent 
amendments. 
Financial market analysts, prominent economists and influential 
newspapers such as The Economist, the Financial Times and The Wall 
Street Journal, have almost continuously been expressing serious 
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doubts, arguing that Greece’s fiscal situation is unsustainable without 
default and exit from the euro area. 
The fiscal adjustment effort was set to take place in conditions of falling 
real GDP and rising unemployment. According to the 2nd revision of the 
Greek Adjustment Program of May 2011, the deficit of the general 
government was projected to fall from 15.4% of GDP in 2009 to 2.6% of 
GDP in 2014. Yet, the debt to GDP ratio was projected to rise from 
127.1% of GDP in 2009 to 153% of GDP in 2014. This is because of the 
negative differential between growth and the real interest rate, and the 
fact that Greece was to continue having primary deficits until 2011. It is 
only in the fourth and fifth year of the program that Greece was 
projected to have substantial primary surpluses. Although the program 
appeared front-loaded at first sight, in actual fact it also envisaged a 
steep fiscal adjustment effort at the end of the program period as well. 
The main elements of the 2010-2011 Greek Adjustment Program are 
depicted in Table 2. A number of points can be made concerning the 
structure of the program. 
First, the program foresaw a very large fiscal adjustment over five years. 
The adjustment in the primary deficit of the general government is equal 
to 16.4 percentage points of GDP. This is clearly unprecedented. The 
largest comparable adjustment that has been achieved to date, between 
1989 and 1994, was equivalent to 9.7 percentage points of GDP over five 
years. From a primary deficit of 5.5% of GDP in 1989, Greece moved to a 
primary surplus of 4.2% of GDP in 1994. The second largest comparable 
adjustment took place between 2004 and 2006 and was equivalent to 
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3.2 percentage points of GDP. From a primary deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 
2004, Greece moved to a primary surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 2006. 
Second, the adjustment was concentrated in two sub-periods. 2010-11 
and 2013-14. The 2010 adjustment was a correction of the excesses of 
electoral 2009, when government revenue collapsed and primary 
expenditure temporarily shot up. The adjustment of 2013-14 is set to 
take place in the context of an expected recovery from a prolonged 
recession. In addition, the 2010 adjustment was to some extent the easy 
part, as the 2009 fiscal year was burdened by one-off factors that 
increased the deficit. 
Third, neither economic growth, nor interest payments on the rising 
debt to GDP ratio facilitate the adjustment. The adjustment of the 
primary deficit is taking place in the context of falling GDP, at least until 
the end of 2011. In addition, because of the increase of the debt to GDP 
ratio, interest payments are rising relative to GDP, causing a much 
smaller reduction in the general government deficit, compared to the 
primary deficit. As the original program of 2010 itself states (page 13), 
“fiscal consolidation measures from 2010 to 2014 … are well in excess of 
the reduction of the deficit over the same period.” Unlike the more 
recent adjustment period of 2005-2006, when economic growth 
remained robust, Greece has to “swim against the tide” for the first 
three years of the program. 
Fourth, although at first sight the fiscal adjustment effort appears 
roughly equally divided between the revenue and the expenditure side, 
it actually relies more heavily on the adjustment of primary expenditure. 
Once one allows for the projected increase in interest payments, the 
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program appears to be based 50% more on the containment of primary 
(i.e. non-interest) government expenditure than on the increase in total 
revenue. Total revenue is projected to increase from 37.3% of GDP in 
2009 to 42.6% of GDP in 2014, an increase of 5.3 percentage points of 
GDP. Primary expenditure is projected to fall from 47.6% of GDP in 2009 
to 36.5% of GDP in 2014. This is a much bigger reduction of 8.9 
percentage points of GDP. Such an adjustment in primary expenditure 
could prove to be a positive feature of the program, but one has to note 
that it is unprecedented. In fact, in an ex post analysis of all previous 
fiscal adjustment programs in Greece, the largest contribution has been 
from the revenue side. One can only hope that “this time is different”. 
Fifth, the fiscal adjustment itself appears to exert a strong negative 
influence on GDP growth and thus, to a certain extent, defeats the 
purpose. Domestic demand was projected to fall by 7.7% in 2010 and 
6.0% in 2011. The biggest negative contributions come from government 
consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital formation 
(investment). On the other hand, the external sector was projected to 
exert a rather strong positive influence on GDP growth: 2.3 percentage 
points in 2010 and 2.9 percentage points in 2011. To a large extent this 
is attributed to a sharp decline in imports of goods and services. A strong 
recovery in exports was projected from 2011 onwards. 
The program is quite detailed in the measures that it envisages and its 
implementation takes place aided by close monitoring and strong 
conditionality. Despite this, there are a number of weaknesses in its 
design, and a number of risks concerning its implementation. 
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The main weakness of the program appears to be related to the fact that 
the fiscal adjustment itself contributes to a prolongation and deepening 
of the 2009 recession. Indeed, a three year recession is envisaged in the 
program itself, something that obviously contributes to a slower fiscal 
adjustment and worse public debt dynamics. In the forthcoming 
revision, the recession is expected to continue well into 2012. As a 
result, and despite the fiscal adjustment envisaged in the program, the 
debt to GDP will continue rising well into 2013 and possibly 2014. 
To an extent the contractionary macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
adjustment are inevitable. However, a more effective mix of the 
envisaged fiscal adjustment, as well as a simpler and well defined tax 
policy could help.  The policy on direct taxation envisaged in the 
program is an unnecessary disincentive to new investment in plant and 
machinery, as well as real estate, without significant benefits in terms of 
additional revenue. The program envisages ad hoc, indiscriminate and 
uncertain rises in direct taxes, which discourage investment and 
economic growth and thus hinder the recovery and make the necessary 
fiscal adjustment more painful. This policy on direct taxation may prove 
to be one of the main reasons why Greece may fail to recover soon 
enough, and may lead to a failure of the program as a whole. 
It would help if the program envisaged a stable and credible tax regime 
that would be characterized by simplicity and clarity and would provide 
appropriate investment incentives. The program envisages significant 
increases in both direct and indirect tax rates. Yet, while revenue from 
indirect taxes is projected to rise from 11.1% of GDP in 2009 to 14.5% of 
GDP in 2014, revenue from direct taxation is projected to remain almost 
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constant relative to GDP. From 8.1% of GDP in 2009 it is projected to rise 
to only 9.1% of GDP in 2014. At the same time, the projected increases 
in direct and property tax rates, which yield minimal net new revenue, 
will have strong negative effects on business investment and investment 
in housing, as well as the creation of new enterprises. In addition, the 
tax regime appears to be undergoing major changes every three months, 
something which contributes to the confusion and is probably the 
biggest disincentive to investment and the recovery of the Greek 
economy. 
Finally, the timing of the measures undertaken does not appear to be 
effective either. A lot of political capital is being spent on measures that 
have small and delayed effects on growth and competitiveness, like the 
liberalization of some professions, and too little on measures that have 
significant effects on the reduction of the fiscal deficit. This lack of 
appropriate priorities has already created reform fatigue, without 
significant effects on either fiscal adjustment or economic growth and 
employment. 
 
7.  Fiscal Sustainability and Debt Restructuring 
«It is time to recognize that Greece is not just suffering from a liquidity 
crisis; it is facing an insolvency crisis too. Rating agencies have started to 
downgrade its public debt to junk level, while spreads on Greek sovereign 
bonds last week spiked to new highs. The €110bn bail-out agreed by the 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund in May only delays 
the inevitable default and risks making it disorderly when it comes. 
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Instead, an orderly restructuring of Greece’s public debt is needed now» 
N. Roubini, Financial Times, June 28, 2010. 
Many international analysts had been advocating that Greece ought to 
restructure its public debt, as, even if the stabilization program 
succeeds, it will be very difficult to persuade the markets that it has 
achieved fiscal sustainability. After all, the 2010 adjustment program 
itself envisaged that the public debt to GDP ratio will reach almost 153% 
of GDP in 2014, from less than 100% in 2008. 
Proposals for a major debt restructuring abounded. In fact, a major 
restructuring is envisaged in the October 2011 decisions on Greece. 
Under the terms of the so-called Private Sector Involvement (PSI), 
institutional investors such as banks, pension funds and hedge funds are 
given the option of exchanging their holdings of Greek bonds maturing in 
2011-2014 for new bonds of longer maturity, at a discount of 50%. 
The restructuring analysis is based on the idea that Greek debt is 
unsustainable at the level of 150% of GDP, but somehow sustainable at, 
say, 120% of GDP. 
This analysis is partial and obviously flawed. Fiscal sustainability requires 
that the government ought to create and maintain primary surpluses the 
present value of which is greater than or equal to the original debt. At a 
more practical level it requires a primary surplus that, as a minimum, 
stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio. This obviously depends on the initial 
debt to GDP ratio, but it also depends crucially on the growth rate of 
GDP relative to the interest rate on the debt. 
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In Table 3 we present the primary surplus required for fiscal 
sustainability, for various combinations of the GDP growth rate and the 
initial debt to GDP ratio. We assume an interest rate of 5%, which is the 
average interest rate on Greek debt. 
As can be seen from Table 3, because of the recession in which the 
Greek economy has been trapped in the last three years, fiscal 
sustainability requires significant primary surpluses in relation to Greek 
GDP, irrespective of the initial debt to GDP ratio. For a nominal GDP 
growth rate of -5%, as is now the case in Greece, a debt restructuring 
that reduces the debt to GDP ratio from 140% of GDP back to 100% of 
GDP, only reduces the primary surplus required for sustainability from 
14% of GDP to 10% of GDP. If on the other hand the nominal GDP 
growth rate were to be increased to 3% per annum, which only requires 
a weak recovery of the Greek economy, the primary surplus required for 
sustainability would fall 14% to 2.8% of GDP, even for a debt to GDP 
ratio of 140% of GDP. In such a case, debt restructuring would have an 
even smaller impact. A debt restructuring that reduces the initial debt to 
GDP ratio to 100% of GDP would in such a case result in a required 
primary surplus of 2% of GDP, instead of 2.8%. 
To conclude, debt restructuring eases the fiscal burden on a country that 
is prepared to stabilize its debt to GDP ratio through appropriate primary 
surpluses, but it does not do away with the need for significant primary 
surpluses as long as the recession continues. The most efficient way to 
reduce the primary surpluses required for debt sustainability is not 
through a partial default, but through policies that contribute to higher 
growth and thus reduce the gap between the real interest rate and the 
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growth rate. If Greece could recover from the recession that has plagued 
it in the last three years, and achieve sustainable growth of say 2% per 
annum plus moderate inflation, then the primary surplus required for 
sustainability would fall by more than ten (10) percentage points of GDP. 
If the gap between the real interest rate and the growth rate remains 
where it is today, the 30% haircut of Greece’s public debt to GDP ratio 
through the October 2011 agreement will only result in a fall of the 
primary surplus required for sustainability which is only a fraction of that 
(3 percentage points of GDP). The required fiscal adjustment would 
remain huge and possibly non-feasible.   
At the end of the original program period in 2014, Greece was expected 
to have achieved a primary surplus of almost 6% of GDP. This, if 
sustained, and if the economy recovered as envisaged in the program, 
would have made Greece’s fiscal situation sustainable. If Greece could 
maintain the primary surplus at 6% of GDP, the public debt to GDP ratio 
would have started falling by more than 5% points of GDP per annum. In 
fact, this is envisaged in the last year of the 2010 program, where an 
interest rate of 5% and nominal GDP growth of 3% per annum (2% real 
growth plus 1% inflation) are assumed. In the ten years to 2024, 
Greece’s debt to GDP ratio would have fallen back to about 100%, under 
these assumptions. If Greece were to achieve real growth higher than 
2% per annum, or if real interest rates were lower, the debt to GDP ratio 
would have fallen at a higher pace. The debt restructuring envisaged in 
the October 2011 agreement will cause Greece’s debt to fall to a level 
much lower than 100% by 2024, but this will largely be a one off effect. 
As shown in Table 3, the dynamics of the debt are not affected that 
much by the agreed “haircut”. 
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8.  Some Tentative Conclusions  
To conclude, in broad terms, the policy envisaged in Greece’s 
adjustment program appears feasible. From now on, the main focus 
should remain the achievement of a sufficiently high primary surplus, 
which would initially stabilize the debt to GDP ratio and then cause it to 
start falling. Debt restructuring should remain voluntary, as envisaged in 
the private sector involvement (PSI) program. 
The question on everybody’s lips is whether the Greek program can 
succeed.  
My answer is a qualified yes. The Greek program can succeed if Greece 
were to exercise long-term fiscal discipline as envisaged in the program 
and respect the rules of the stability and growth pact moving gradually 
into a small budget surplus. This will have to be maintained for a 
sufficient number of years. However, the program must undergo 
adjustments that will speed up the recovery of the Greek economy. 
As I have already argued, Greece’s crisis is not simply a debt crisis. It is a 
dual confidence crisis, due to the mismanagement of the expectations of 
international creditors and domestic consumers and investors. Thus, to 
resolve the crisis, confidence needs to be restored on both fronts. The 
main difficulty of the Greek program is that is has so far failed to address 
the confidence crisis that has led to its adoption. The Greek program 
ought to be modified to break this vicious circle. This must be the top 
priority of the new government. 
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The first sign of success will be the stabilization of the debt to GDP ratio. 
Under the 2010 program this is not envisaged before 2014. This is due to 
the prolonged and deep recession, which serves to further destabilize 
the debt to GDP ratio. The recession is set to continue into 2012. To 
address the dual confidence crisis, the Greek program ought to be 
revised in a way that enhances its credibility, and produces some early 
results. 
It should become a top priority to adjust policy in the program so that 
the recovery comes sooner than 2013. Greece can achieve the necessary 
fiscal adjustment with much lower business taxation, much lower 
property taxes and a much simpler income tax schedule for households. 
It is right and proper to rely more on consumption taxes, such as VAT 
and excise duties, in an economy where consumption is clearly excessive 
relative to the productive potential. A radical reform of the direct and 
property tax system, which will create expectations of no further 
changes, is probably the best tool for restoring the confidence of 
domestic investors, and thus help the Greek economy recover. The tax 
regime that was put in place at the end of 2009 is unduly complicated, 
contains significant disincentives to economic activity and investment, 
and is being revised far too frequently. All these elements work against 
both the recovery and the fiscal adjustment of the Greek economy. 
So far, both Greece and its European partners have failed in restoring 
confidence. This does not mean that they cannot learn from past 
mistakes and eventually succeed. This would be good for both Greece 
and the rest of the world. 
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Appendix 
Chart 1 
Growth Rate of GDP in Greece and the Euro Area 
 





Unemployment Rates in Greece and the Euro Area 
 
 Source: European Commission (2010) 
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Chart 3 
Inflation in Greece and the Euro Area 
 







The Current Account of Greece 
 
 Source: European Commission (2010) 
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Chart 5 
The Explosion of Public Debt 







Deficits of the General Government 
 
 Source: European Commission (2010) 
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Chart 7 
Greece’s GDP per capita, relative to the EU-15 
 
Source: European Commission (2010). GDP for Greece and the EU is measured in 




Spread of Greek 10 year Government Bonds 
 
Source: European Central Bank. The spread if the difference of the yield of 10 year bonds of 
Greece and Germany 
 











Elections and Governing Parties in Greece since 1974 
 
Election Incoming Government 
1974, November ND (Constantine Karamanlis) 
1977, November ND (Constantine Karamanlis) 
1981, October PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1985, June PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1989, June ND in Coalition (Tzannis Tzannetakis) 
1989, November National Unity (Xenophon Zolotas) 
1990, April ND (Constantine Mitsotakis) 
1993, October PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1996, September PASOK (Constantine Simitis) 
2000, March PASOK (Constantine Simitis) 
2004, March ND (Costas Karamanlis) 
2007, September ND (Costas Karamanlis) 
2009, October PASOK (George Papandreou) 
 










Greece’s Original Adjustment Program, 2010-2014 
(2nd Revision of May 2011) 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
       
Real GDP Growth -2.4% -4.5% -3.0% 1.1% 2.1% 2.1% 
     Domestic Demand -2.1% -7.7% -6.0% -1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 
     Net Trade 2.2% 2.3% 2.9% 1.8% 1.3% 1.1% 
       
Unemployment Rate 9.1% 11.5% 14.5% 15.0% 14.5% 14.0% 
Inflation (HICP) 1.3% 4.7% 2.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 
       
General Government Deficit 15.4% 10.5% 7.6% 6.5% 4.8% 2.6% 
     Interest Payments 5.2% 5.5% 6.8% 7.8% 8.3% 8.7% 
     Primary Expenditure 47.6% 44.0% 42.3% 41.2% 38.9% 36.5% 
     Revenue 37.3% 39.1% 41.5% 42.5% 42.4% 42.6% 
Primary Deficit 10.3% 4.9% 0.8% -1.3% -3.4% -6.1% 
       
General Government Debt 127.1% 142.7% 156.7% 161.3% 160.1% 153.0% 
       
Current Account Balance -13.1% -11.8% -9.9% -7.7% -6.6% -5.8% 
 
 Source: European Commission 
 
 










Primary Surplus Required for Fiscal Sustainability 
For Different GDP Growth Rates and Debt to GDP Ratios 
 



































































In the vertical axis we measure the rate of growth of nominal GDP, while on the horizontal 
axis we measure the public debt to GDP ratio. The nominal interest rate is assumed at 5%, 
which is the average interest rate on Greek debt. 
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